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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
T. VAL CHRISTIANSEN 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
UTAH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY, 
a corporation, and UNION 
' PACIFIC RAILROAD, a 
I corporation Defendants-Respondents 
I ---------------------------------------
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Case No. 15751 
I. THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATION IS 78-12-23(2)AND 
; PROVIDES FOR A SIX YEAR STATUTE WHEN ACTION IS BASED UPON AN INSTRUMENT 
I IN WRITING. 
Defendant-Respondent argues that this action is barred 
I o' y the h f · ' 7 8 2 6 f d ' t ree year statute o limita tions found in -1 -2 . De en ants 
I argument is extraordinary in light of the circumstances surrounding 
' this case. As previously set forth this action is based upon a Special 
Warranty Deed from Defendants to Plaintiffs. Clearly a warranty deed 
is an instrument in writing, thus coming under the six year statute of 
limitations. Defendants' argument that this is an action for breach 
of covenants of title and consequently is an action created by the 
statutes of this state, coming under 78-12-26(4), providing for a 
three year statute of limitation would effectively abrogate the need for 
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the other more specific statute of limitations provisions found in the 
1 
code. If defendants' argument were adopted, it could be used in numerc.i 
situations and would effectively circumvent the purpose of having a s:x 
year statute of limitations for written documents. 
The statute cited by Defendants specifically intends by 
its very wording and plain meaning that it would not apply in this 
situation, Section 78-12-26(4) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 1 
states that it applies: 
"except where in special cases a different 
limitation is prescribed by the statutes 
of this state." 
The case at bar is certainly one of those situations coming under 
the aforementioned exception, because of another statute, to wit: 78·1.1 
23(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, has provided for the I 
"special cases" in which written instruments are the basis of an actic:I 
In addition this Court in Soderberg v. Holt, 8 6 Utah 485, 
46P 2d 428(1935), has applied the 6(six) year statute to a claim for 
breach of a covenant under a warranty deed. 
Plaintiff submits that Defendants cannot seriously argue 
before this Court that the 3(three) year statute of limitations is 
applicable, in light of the plain clear meaning of the statutes inw~ 
and a previous judicial determination by this court. 
POINT II 
II. MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT ARE IN DISPUTE AND IT WAS 
IMPROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Defendant on page 7 of its brief states, "the material 
facts in this case are not disputed". Defendant on page 3 in his 
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i statement of facts states: 
"On Sepetember 16, 1956, Plaintiff-Appellant 
leased from the Los Angeles and Salt Lake Rail-
roa~ a triangular piece of property adjoining the 
subJect property on the south. There was attached 
to that lease as Exhibit A a plat showing the 
property leased. On that plat there is shown a 
spur track number 6 which parallels and bounds 
the east boundary line of the subject property. 
Shown to the west on the plat outline is a 
double line in the middle of which appear the 
words "spur track (abandoned) . " Since September 
16, 1946, up to the present time, Plaintiff-
Appellant has been aware of the fact that there 
was an easement which was designated as abandoned 
by the railroad extending through the subject 
property. (Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 
1968, paragraph 7.) Plaintiff had knowledge at 
the time of his purchase that there had been a 
spur track located on the property. (Wunderli 
Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 11.) 
I Defendant uses his interpretation of the facts to support his argu-
j ment that Plaintiff's claim is barred even if the 6(six) year statute 
of limit a t.ions is applicable. Defendant is thus claiming that Plaintiff 
was put on notice of the subject easement either in 1946 or 1956 
I 
1 (Defendant uses both dates as show in Defendants' s brief as quoted 
I 
above). Certainly the time that Plaintiff first became aware of a 
possible easement which might cloud his title and prevent him from con-
I ~ying his property is a "material issue of fact", going to the 
question of when the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiff's 
claim. 
of facts: 
In Plaintiff's initial brief it is stated in the statement 
On or about the 13th day of March, 1973, while 
Plaintiff-Appellant was attempting to negotiate 
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the sale or the re-financing of the subject 
property, the Plaintiff-Appellant first received 
notice that the Defendant, UNION PACIFIC 
RAILROAD claimed an interest in the subject 
property, to wit: a twenty-five (25) foot right-
of-way. Notice was first received by verbal 
communication on March 13, 1973 and Plaintiff-
Appellant was first shown a Plat Map showing 
the claimed interest on May 22, 1973. (Affadavit 
of Plaintiff dated August 5, 1977, Pages 1 and 
2, Paragraphs 6,7,8 and 11.) 
From the statement of facts of both parties used for appe: 
it appears clear on its face that a substantial dispute over a rnateri: 
issue of fact does exist. That issue could be stated as: 
"When did Plaintiff first receive notice of 
a possible defect in his title?" 
Plaintiff contends this was in 1973, and Defendants contends this wu 
in 1946, or 1956. Certainly an issue of this magnitude should have 
prevented the lower court from granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants. Plaintiff reiterates that in a motion for summary judgme: 
the factual issues must be considered in a light most favorable to U; 
party opposing the motion. Welchman vs. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P. l 
410(1959), Controlled Receivables Inc. vs. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 4: 
P. 2d 807 (1966), Burningham vs. Ott,525 P.2d 620 (1974). 
The factual dispute abovementioned, if seen in favor of 
Plaintiff, would thus not bar Plaintiff's cause of action based on tr 
notion of when Plaintiff first received notice. 
Plaintiff submits that numerous spur tracts were previous:: 
used on the subject property and the specific trackage mentioned by 
Defendant in his statement of facts is not even the same trackage whiC" 
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!the basis of the .claim upon which this action is based. The track 
i 
,mentioned by Defendant is in fact separate, distinct and distinguishable 
::ram that section which is the basis of this action. 
A se.cond material issue of fact that is in dispute is 
~hether the easement previously granted by the Defendant prevented 
,Plaintiff from selling, conveying, mortgaging or transferring his pro-
!.lperty consequently damaging him. In Plaintiff's statement of facts it 
j 
is stated: 
"The action of the Defendants prevented the Plaintiff 
from selling or re-financing the subject property due 
to the fact that no buyer or lender was willing to buy 
or re-finance this property because of the claimed 
right-of-way. As a direct result of these events, 
Plaintiff-Appellant was evicted from the property 
in a foreclosure action and was undable to redeem 
the property." 
!tjPlaintiff has stated that the facts will show that he was in fact 
evicted from his property as a direct result of actions of the 
::: 
,Defendant, in conveying a right-of-way which directly would go through 
)· 
· 1 Plaintiff's building on the premesis. 
Defendants contend however, as stated in their statement of 
facts: 
'I 
I 
"In 1970 and 1971 Plaintiff-Appellant suffered a 
major setback in tlte operation of ~i7 business.du~ 
to the theft of equipment. (Deposition of Plainti~f 
dated March 14, 1977, p. 32, lines 21 an~ 22.) This 
led to the failure of his business, and in the.years 
1971 through 1975, Plaintiff-Appellant had no income. 
(Deposition of Plaintiff dated March 14, 1977, P· 
32 lines 12-20.)" 
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"Due to the failure of his business, Plaintiff 
was unable to make the mortgage payments on the 
subject property (Wunderli Affidavit dated January 
6, 1978, paragraph 12), and on March 10, 1975, 
Dean Terry and Vilate Terry, holders of the 
mortgage, obtained a judgment and decree of fore-
closure of the mortgage. The property was sold 
at public auction and the Plaintiff-Appellant 
failed to redeem the property. (Wunderli 
Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 10.)" 
Defendants position seems to be that it was in fact not: 
subject easement that caused Plaintiff to forfeit the property in que;-
because of the unwillingness of both buyers and lending institutions 
to deal with property that might have a defective title, but that 
business setbacks were the cause of Plaintiff's lo sing the property. 
Plaintiff's position as set forth above is in direct opposition to~ 
Certainly, this is a material issue of fact. Plaintiff 
should be allowed to present evidence as to why he lost the subject 
property. It was improper for the district court to grant summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants in light of these material issues 
of fact, still in dispute, and which certainly could be outcome deter 
minitive. 
POINT III 
I I I . THE COVENANT IN QUESTION IN THIS CASE '.'7AS, HO MAT' 
HOW DESIGNATED, A COVENANT THAT "RUNS WITH THE LAND" AND IS NOT BREA( 
UNTIL PLAINTIFF WAS PUT ON NOTICE AND HARMED THEREBY. 
As Plaintiff has previously stated, a covenent of this 
nature, and the breach thereof could be characterized as any one 
of the following: 
(1) Quiet Enjoyment 
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(2) Encumbrances 
(3) General Warranty 
Defendants argu ment concerning the law surrounding a 
covenant of "seisin" is misplaced and not applicable in the case now 
before the court. Plaintiff submits that the Defendant was seised of 
the property in question and both sides have agreed that Defendant 
did in fact own the land which they conveyed to Plaintiff. If in fact 
the covenant of seisin is breached at the time of conveyance, that has 
no effect at all on the present case, because we are not dealing with 
the breach of the covenant of seisin. We are dealing with the (3) 
three covenants as specified above. The following cases cited by 
Defendant are thus not related to the issue before the Court: 
Creason vs. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P. 2d 403 (1970); Bernklau 
v. Stephens, 150 Colo. 187, 371 p. 2d 765 (1962); Anderson vs. Larson, 
177 Minn. 606, 225 N.W. 902(1929); Faller vs. Davis, 30 Okl. 56, 118 
P. 382 (1911). Plaintiff also points out that with the exception of 
the Creason case which merely states the majority rule, these cases 
come from other jurisdictions and are not binding on this court. 
Plaintiff submits that Utah has always taken a unique stand in regard 
to covenants in order to protect a remote grantee· 
If the easement in question in this case is seen as either 
a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment or the covenant of general 
warranty, the Defendant cannot seriously argue that it does not, 
"run with the land". This court has previously decided that they 
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do in fact run. Van Cott vs. Jacklin, 63 C 412, 226 P460(1924); 
East Canyon Land and Stock Company vs Davis and Weber Counties Canal 
Company, 65u 560, 238 P280(1925). 
It appears that the only basis that Defandant has to 
contend that this covenant does not run with the land, is to character· 
ize this as a covenant against encumbrances. In Plaintiff's initial 
brief, he outlined the specific law in Utah surrounding a breach of th; 
covenant against encumbrances. The case used by both sides on this 
issue isrof course, Soderberg vs Holt, 86 u 485, 46 P 2d 428 (1935). 
Defendants attempt to distinguish this case due to the fact that the 
Soderberg case involved a money charge and not an easement. This 
attempted distinction is invalid. Soderberg does an excellent job 
analyzing the law of the various states on this issue, and deals 
with much more than strictly the opinion by Judge Cooley in Post v. 
Campau, Liz Mich 90, 3 N.W. 272, (1879). The court then makes the gen1 
holding as Plaintiff has previously cited (p.6 of initial brief). 
The Court decided that the logical fabric of the law and equity would 
be better served to hold that a covenant against encumbrances does 
run with the land and thus a claim by a remote grantee is not barred 
with a valid claim. In addition, this court has further stressed 
that the true nature of the covenant against encumbrances is a covenant 
to indemnify. Pacific Bond and Mortgage Company vs. Ruhn,101 U 335, 
121P.2 635 (1942). 
If this Court were to adopt Defendants' argument it would 
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lin effect prevent a remote grantee that had no notice of an encumbrance 
1 from processing his claim against a grantor that had encumbered the 
[transferred proT_:Jer ly. Plaintiff submits that this court should adopt 
] the position that a covenant against encumbrances runs with the land . 
. 1 The District Court erred in granting summary judgment on 
I this issue, due to the fact that the holding of the court is against the 
,;I law in the State of Utah. 
PART IV 
IV. DEFENDANT GRANTED THE EASEMENT IN QUESTION PRIOR TO 
DEFENDANT'S CONVEYANCE TO PLAINTIFF AND SHOULD BE HELD TO THE CONSE-
QUENCES OF THEIR ACTS . 
Defendants argue that since this claim did not come to light 
! until after their conveyance to Plaintiff, they should not be held 
I 
' liable under the implied covenants of a Special Warranty Deed. Plaintiff 
I 
I 
! fails to comprehend how the Defendant can come before this Court and 
I~ 
1
1 
argue, that even though they had conveyed this easement, resulting 
] in a defect in Plaintiff's title to the subject property, they should 
I not be held liable for these acts because they were prior to the 
~nveyance to Plaintiff. (p. 16 of Defendants' brief.) The whole 
I purpose of implying covenants in a deed is to protect a grantee from 
I 
1 
acts done by a grantor. Certainly, the Defendant should be held 
t 
liable. Defendant , not a third party, made the conveyances which 
I Plaintiff has alleged resulted in damage to him. For the Court to 
I 
·adopt Defendants' argument would abrogate the purpose of implied covenants 
au together. 
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CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment should be reversed. Material issues 
of fact remain. There is no statute of limitations bar to Plaintiff's I 
claim. An eviction took place giving rise to Plaintiff's claim. 
Defendants have effectively conceeded that the Marketable Record Title 
Act is not a bar to Plaintiff's claim. I 
I 
Re~ectfully Submitted, I 
7.rL~ Mf;,E~N~ I 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal . 
66 Exchange Place I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 ' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellan~ 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant to 
McKay, Burton, Thurr.ian & Condie, Attorneys for Defendants-
Re •ponden t., 5 0 O Kennecott Bu~ salt Lal'e city, u tah . 
thi• 5th day of January, 1979.~ !!! . !Y1~ 
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